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Abstract 
Can deep learning (DL) guide our understanding of computations happening in           
biological brain? We will first briefly consider how DL has contributed to the research on               
visual object recognition. In the main part we will assess whether DL could also help us                
to clarify the computations underlying higher cognitive functions such as Theory of            
Mind. In addition, we will compare the objectives and learning signals of brains and              
machines, leading us to conclude that simply scaling up the current DL algorithms will              
most likely not lead to human level Theory of Mind.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Introduction 
 
In this perspective we will first very briefly review how ​deep learning (DL) has helped us                
to study visual object recognition in the primate brain (see Kriegeskorte, 2015; Yamins             
& DiCarlo, 2016 for more thorough reviews). The successful application of DL in vision              
leads to the question whether these models could help us to also gain insights into other                
aspects of human cognition. It is presently unclear whether DL can lead to improved              
understanding of other cognitive processes beyond vision. In the main part of the paper              
we ask whether DL could also help us to understand the emergence of higher cognitive               
functions such as Theory of Mind.  
 
Marrying biology and AI: The success story in vision 
DL as a model for primate vision 
 
Visual object recognition in primates is mediated by a hierarchy of transformations along             
the occipitotemporal cortex (​DiCarlo et al., 2012​). Intriguingly, it has been shown that             
these transformations are quite similar to the hierarchy of transformations learned by            
deep neural networks (DNN) trained to recognize objects on natural images. Several            
pieces of work have demonstrated a direct correspondence between the hierarchy of            
the human visual areas and the layers of the DNNs (Gülcu 2015, Seibert, 2016, Cichy               
et al., 2016; Eickenberg 2016; Kuzovkin et al., 2018).  
 
While DL has offered an algorithmic model for (feedforward) visual object recognition in             
brains, these developments do not provide a full understanding of biological vision (Cox,             
2014; Kriegeskorte, 2015; VanRullen, 2017). Most importantly, in biological vision at           
least part of the processing is done by feedback connections (Roelfsema, 2006),            
although the exact computational role of feedback is less clear (See Bastos et al, 2012               
for one particular view). The DL networks commonly used in machine vision are             
feedforward, although there is a recent trend towards incorporating feedback (e.g. Wen            
et al., 2018). Also, it is important to note that the DL networks still explain only a part of                   
the variability of the neural responses happening in real brains. Hence, the present-day             
DL networks cannot be seen as the ultimate model of biological visual processing (e.g.              
Kriegeskorte, 2015; Rajalingham et al, 2018). Nevertheless, the work with DL has            
 
illuminated how relatively simple transformations applied throughout a hierarchy of          
processing stages can be associated with successful object recognition. 
What has made DL successful for investigating biological vision? 
 
The recent developments in DL have been made possible by increased computational            
power, refinements to the algorithms, and availability of large data-sets necessary for            
training DL networks (LeCun et al., 2015). Beyond these factors there are several             
specific aspects to consider that have enabled DL to be helpful for investigating             
biological vision. There are three aspects to highlight: 1) Appropriate training data:            
DNNs are a good model for biological object recognition as they are trained on datasets               
that are directly relevant for biological vision: natural images (i.e. Imagenet (Deng et al.,              
2009)); 2) A training objective that is similar to biological vision: Machine vision has the               
straightforward goal to accurately recognize objects in a scene (or to segment or             
localize them) which resembles the goal of the biological vision (see below for a more               
nuanced view); 3) Good neuroscientific comparison data: It has become much more            
straightforward to measure the activity of biological vision systems. In the case of vision              
we have a fairly good understanding of the areas involved in vision, how they are               
connected and organized. Decades of work on the visual system have revealed the             
visual processing hierarchy which can and has been compared to the hierarchy of             
transformations learned by DL systems (Gülcu 2015, Seibert, 2016, Cichy et al., 2016;             
Eickenberg 2016). In the case of vision all these aspects together were needed for DL               
to inform us about the mechanisms underlying visual object recognition.  
 
Challenges ahead: using DL to study other aspects 
of cognition 
Studying vision with the help of DL seems justified - both the artificial and the biological                
visual systems solve a similar task with a similar performance, both are hierarchical and              
require the transformation of features from simple to more complex. From this            
perspective, using DL to investigate the computations underlying mindreading might          
seem a bit far-fetched as Theory of Mind seems quite different from vision: Theory of               
Mind (or mindreading) is an essential ability of humans to infer the mental states of               
others such as for example their perceptual states, beliefs, knowledge, desires, or            
intentions (for review Apperly, 2010). While we share basic visual processes with most             
other mammals, it is thought that the scope and complexity of mindreading skills sets us               
 
apart from most of the animal kingdom (Call & Tomasello, 2008). Hence even if one               
would agree that DNNs are useful for understanding vision, it is unclear whether DNNs              
have anything to tell us about mindreading. How could this ability to understand what              
others think and intend emerge from artificial neural networks (Lake et al., 2017; Baker              
et al., 2017)? On the other hand, diverse research supports the view that mindreading              
to a large extent is an acquired skill, just like reading (Apperly, 2010; Heyes & Frith,                
2014). And if mindreading skills require training, similarly to vision, then DL networks             
could help to unravel at least some of the computations underlying mindreading. To             
highlight this aspect of being learned we will henceforth use the term “mindreading”             
instead of “theory of mind” in this manuscript (see also Apperly, 2010; Heyes & Frith,               
2014).  
 
We feel that mindreading will be an important topic to study with the modern tools               
offered by DL for two several reasons. First, if the goal is to build artificial agents that                 
think and behave at (least at) the level of humans, then there might not be a way around                  
studying mindreading. This is because at least according to some prominent views            
about communication, mindreading is necessary for the emergence of meaningful          
communication and language (Tomasello, 2010; 2014; Scott-Phillips 2014; Mercier &          
Sperber, 2017). This perspective suggests that training agents with DL on huge text             
corpora will never lead to agents that are able to communicate with humans or with               
each other in a meaningful fashion. Hence, the only way to build these agents is to first                 
understand and build in mindreading capabilities. However, this is a daunting task, as             
there is still much unclarity about mindreading in humans and animals (e.g. Siegal,             
2008; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Apperly, 2010; Heyes & Frith, 2014; Scott & Baillargeon,              
2017). Second, given that there is still much controversy about mindreading even in             
humans, we believe that modern DL tools can actually help to better understand             
mindreading. This is because in artificial systems one can add and modify single             
components of the system. For example, one could see how having an external             
memory (i.e. separately from the deep neural network) can help the agents in acquiring              
basic mindreading skills. Similarly, as discussed in the next section, one can see             
whether and which mindreading skills can emerge through reinforcement learning.          
Third, similarly to how we require mindreading skills to understand other humans, we             
will need mindreading skills in AI systems for them to understand human intentions, for              
example in human-machine interaction (see ​Rabinowitz et al., 2018). ​For these reasons            
we think there will be a surge of DL works into mindreading.  
 
In this perspective article we want to discuss how DL could contribute to studying              
mindreading. We will first delineate some problems in studying mindreading with DL.            
Next we will offer one particular way for studying mindreading with DL. We will conclude               
 
that the present day DL algorithms are not sufficient for acquiring human like             
mindreading skills and describe some of these learning signals relevant for acquiring            
mindreading skills in biological brains. 
DL to study the emergence of mindreading 
 
As noted above, progress in machine vision has been so beneficial for the study of               
biological vision because of comparable training data and similar training objectives for            
biological and machine vision algorithms. On top of that in the case of vision there is                
appropriate neuroscientific data to compare to the outcomes of DNN. All of these             
aspects are yet missing or severely underdeveloped in mindreading research. What           
would constitute good training data for teaching artificial agents how to read other             
minds? Which neuroscientific data could one compare the artificial models to? And,            
most importantly, what would be the training objective?  
 
To make any meaningful comparison between the AI agents and biological agents with             
regard to mindreading, one needs to find a task that is similar or at least comparable to                 
both (as in vision, where often the task for both biological and artificial agents is to                
recognize objects). Although there are several classic tasks for studying human           
mindreading (e.g. the Sally and Anne task), they depend on language and executive             
functions (see Apperly, 2010, for a review). However, we believe that as a first step it is                 
necessary to study the core mindreading skills possessed already by preverbal infants            
and non-human animals (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Call & Tomasello, 2008).  
 
In the early 2000s Brian Hare, Josep Call and Michael Tomasello performed an             
excellent series of experiments demonstrating that chimpanzees exhibit at least some           
characteristics of mindreading (Hare et al., 2000; 2001). The experiments involved two            
chimpanzees, a dominant (D) and a subordinate (S) chimpanzee. (Chimpanzee social           
status is organized hierarchically, i.e. some animals are more dominant than others.)            
When the same piece of food is available for both D and S, the dominant almost always                 
obtains it. In the experiments the two chimpanzees were set into separate cages facing              
each other. Between them, there was a space containing two walls. During the             
experiment, pieces of food were presented. In the critical condition one piece of food              
could only be seen by the subordinate and not by the dominant chimpanzee. Could the               
subordinate take advantage of the fact that the dominant chimpanzee could not            
perceive one piece of food? The results demonstrated that the S chimpanzee indeed             
obtained more food in this condition. Hence, the S chimpanzee was able to take into               
 
account what the D chimpanzee could and could not see: One chimpanzee could take              
the perspective of another chimpanzee. 
 
This was an elegant experiment as it demonstrated that the chimpanzees possess at             
least some basic form of mindreading (Call & Tomasello, 2008). Importantly, such            
competitive settings are easy to implement with AI agents because in this task there is a                
clear goal to optimize for: obtaining food. Of course we do not think that “obtaining food”                
is the sole goal driving mindreading skills in primates (see next section), but having              
such a clear goal provides a tangible starting point for studying mindreading with deep              
reinforcement learning (DRL), where the DNN learns through rewards (e.g. points, Mnih            
et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016). We believe that implementing this task with AI agents                
provides a way to study the computations underlying mindreading.  
 
In our work (Labash et al., 2019), we implemented two agents (“subordinate” and             
“dominant”) who were competing for reward. We investigated whether the behavior of            
the artificial agents reveals some rudimentary skills of perspective taking, similar to the             
chimpanzee work (Hare et al 2000; 2001). The behavior of the agents indeed showed              
evidence for basic perspective taking skills, which demonstrates that at least part of             
perspective taking skills can indeed be learned through DRL.  
 
Figure 1 illustrates how a subordinate agent solves the basic task: go to food if the                
dominant is not observing; avoid the food when the dominant is observing. As can be               
seen from Figure 1 the subordinate agent still occasionally performs the unexpected            
behavior, but all in all it has learned to behave as if it would take into account what the                   
dominant can or can not see. 
 
It is important to note that we are not claiming that DRL would capture all aspects of                 
mindreading. However, by understanding the capabilities and limitations of DRL in           
acquiring mindreading we will better understand the computational demands of          
mindreading, just as DNNs have led to a better understanding of vision. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Quantification of the subordinate behavior and examples of model trajectories ​a) Bar plot with                
the percentage when the model performed the expected optimal behavior. Two expected behaviors are              
distinguished: 1) agent is expected to eat when the food is not observed by the dominant, and 2) agent is                    
expected to avoid when the food is observed by the dominant. ​b) An example of the subordinate agent                  
(green circle) avoiding the food although it should approach it. ​c) An example of the model reaching the                  
food when it should not reach it. ​d) An example of the model performing the expected behavior of                  
navigating and obtaining the food. ​e) An example of model behavior of avoiding the food when this is                  
observed by the dominant agent (red circle). 
 
 
 
This task based on (Hare et al 2000; 2001) is far from ideal when it comes to comparing                  
biological and AI agents. First, such competitive paradigms are not natural for humans.             
This means that comparison to human behavior is lacking and that with this particular              
task one cannot study more complex forms of mindreading. Also, it is hard to study the                
brains of awake chimpanzees, hence elucidating neural mechanisms underlying this          
form of mindreading is hindered. This is unfortunate as it precludes any comparison             
between the representations in brains and representations learned by the AI agents. As             
noted above, our understanding of vision has benefitted from DL exactly because one             
can make such direct comparisons between the representations in DNNs and in            
biological vision (Kriegeskorte, 2015; Yamins & DiCarlo, 2016). To make this happen in             
the domain of mindreading, one needs to design simpler tasks that capture mindreading             
skills but are not dependent on language (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017, see also             
Rabinowitz et al., 2018​). Finally, to acquire mindreading skills the AI agents probably             
need to be equipped with the learning signals available to human infants. In the next               
section we will describe some of these learning signals relevant for acquiring            
mindreading skills in biological brains. 
Goals, rewards and learning in brains and machines 
 
For training AI agents it is important to determine the goal the agent should optimize for.                
Hence, one key question for creating AI algorithms that could be informative about             
biology is “what is the goal of the respective biological system” (Cox, 2014; Marblestone              
et al., 2016; Scholte et al., 2017). In vision, the goal “to recognize objects” could be a                 
good proxy for what the ventral visual stream is optimized for (Yamins & DiCarlo, 2016),               
although it is certainly not the only goal of biological vision (Cox, 2014; Scholte et al.,                
2017). “Recognizing objects” is a goal that is also quite easy to implement in AI. That is                 
one reason why AI has been very useful for the research on vision. In contrast, there is                 
no clear goal function for training AI algorithms for mindreading skills. This is because              
the generic functions that mindreading skills might be optimized for (e.g.           
communication, deception) are themselves complex to formulate and hard to implement           
in AI (but for some important first steps see Foerster et al., 2016; 2017; ​Sukhbaatar &                
Fergus, 2016; Mordatch & Abbeel, 2017; Rabinowitz et al., 2018; Matiisen et al., 2018)​.              
Most likely, such higher cognitive functions arise from the combination of many different             
neural processes that obey their own cost functions (Marblestone et al., 2016). In the              
last section we offered a potential goal in the acquisition of mindreading skills: In the               
context of multi-agent competition (Tampuu et al., 2017), mindreading could emerge           
through a process of an agent trying to maximize the probability of reward (e.g. food               
 
intake) while avoiding competitive interference by other agents (Labash et al., 2019).            
However, we are of course not implying that maximizing the probability of food rewards              
is the sole goal that would lead to mindreading skills to emerge. In this section, we                
would like to provide a better understanding of the goals and learning signals that drive               
biological agents and how these differ from learning in machines. 
 
In the present-day AI approaches it is fashionable to learn directly from data without              
coding prior knowledge into the network, hence “innate biases” may sound a bit like              
heresy (see Marcus, 2018, for a discussion about innateness in AI). However, these             
small biases enable the organism to learn about aspects of the world that have been               
important for the species over the course of evolution, not those that are the most               
salient, novel or statistically dominant in the current environment. By providing the agent             
with ​genetically pre-defined bias one ​can speed up learning the ​relevant features of its              
environment ​(Ullman et al., 2012; Marblestone et al., 2016)​. ​For example, recognizing            
and distinguishing other human beings is important and hence there is an innate bias              
for attending to faces (Johnson, 2005; Reid et al., 2017). In particular, preferences for              
faces over similarly configured non-face objects are present in neonatal infants (Farroni            
et al., 2005) and even in fetuses in the third trimester of pregnancy (Reid et al., 2017).                 
This bias is most likely a subcortical detector for stimuli with face-like configurations             
(Johnson, 2005; Reid et al., 2017) that directs the attention of the organism (e.g.              
through an eye-movement) towards faces. These subcortical detectors bias the cortical           
learning system to process more input about faces and hence the organism learns             
faster about them (Johnson, 2005; Johnson et al., 2015). 
 
Similar biases likely exist for drawing infant’s attention to speech: they direct the             
learning resources of the infant to the speech signal. Speech signals are more             
interesting and arousing for the infant than other environmental sounds (​Perszyk &            
Waxman, 2018) and hence lead to quicker learning about them. Further innate biases             
likely exist for directing the infant’s attention to hands (Ullman et al., 2012), eyes and               
gaze-direction (Grossmann, 2017), and biological motion (Simion et al., 2008). ​For us            
humans, ​such innate biases are a key component of start-up software such as “intuitive              
psychology” (Lake et al., 2016). These biases also make humans more intrinsically            
motivated to learn about other humans (Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2009; Schmidhuber, 2010). 
 
In sum, the innate part about mindreading is that over the course of human evolution               
external learning signals have been adjusted so that the infant brain is very sensitive to               
other people (Burkart et al, 2009; Hawkes, 2014): stimuli such as faces, eyes and              
infant-directed speech aid and guide learning in the infant brain. In other words, other              
people and their behavioral signals are more important for human infants than other             
 
environmental cues. We believe that this sensitivity to the behavior of others makes the              
organism learn more about the behavior and states of other people and hence provides              
one key cornerstone for developing mindreading skills. Instead of wanting to avoid any             
kind of innateness in AI agents, one should embrace at least some innate biases that               
are known to make humans smart (Marcus, 2018). Equipping AI agents with a             
preferential sensitivity to other agents might be necessary to even come close to             
human-like mindreading skills. 
 
Our suggestion is not yet realized by the recent work of Rabinowitz and colleagues              
(2018). In their approach ​Rabinowitz et al., 2018 train a neural network to learn              
mindreading skills while predicting the behavior of an agent in a gridworld. Although this              
study represents one of the first efforts to equip artificial agents with mindreading             
faculties, the authors themselves acknowledge severe limitations. In their approach, the           
agent who was learning mindreading had full observability of the other agent and             
environment, it was trained in a supervised manner, and it did not act on the               
environment (so it can hardly be called an agent). These important aspects limit the              
biological plausibility of both the task and teaching signals used in the learning process.              
It could be argued that if training through supervision works then there is no need for                
“innate biases” to make the systems sensitive to other agents. However, based on our              
analysis we feel that whenever organisms (or artificial mindreading agents) are put to             
complex environments, they benefit from these biases that direct their attention and            
processing resources to particular features of the environment. Future research will           
need to show the range and limits of mindreading skills that can emerge purely through               
supervision. 
 
This is not to say that supervision plays absolutely no role in animal or human learning.                
Social supervision shows to animals and humans “how things are done around here”:             
when a lion cub follows her mother she learns about optimal foraging and navigation;              
when she observes her mother during buffalo hunt, she learns to hunt; when she              
performs rough and tumble play with her siblings, she learns to fight and defend.              
Similarly, human children observe, imitate, play and learn through these behaviors           
(Gopnik, 2017). Recently, the AI community has taken up the challenge to use imitation              
and observation of others as a teaching signal (e.g. Borsa et al., 2017; Bansal et al.,                
2017, Stadie et al., 2017). 
 
Taken together, the training signals for AI agents are very primitive as compared to the               
teaching signals a human baby obtains from the environment. Even when the AI agent              
is trained by both external rewards (points) and internal rewards (prediction errors) as             
done in some recent works (​Pathak et al., 2017, Bellemare et al., 2016), the biological               
 
learning signals are more diverse. Two conclusions follow from this discussion. First,            
simply scaling up the current efforts for developing AI will not lead to human level               
intelligence (or, more narrowly, to mindreading skills). Rather, the AI algorithms need to             
be supported with at least some biases in order to learn from social agents.  
 
Conclusions 
  
Using DL to study visual object recognition has been a success story. Just a few years                
ago one could claim that nobody knows how biological visual recognition works, but             
now DL has provided a working model for at least some aspects of biological vision               
(VanRullen, 2017). DNNs offer a framework for understanding how one can go from             
pixels to meaningful object categorization. The success of DNNs in vision has            
generated a hope that DL could lead to similar progress in understanding higher             
cognitive functions. However, it is also possible that the case of vision is not typical: in                
vision there is abundant training data, good neuroscientific comparison data and a clear             
training objective. As a case example where it might be more complicated for DL to lead                
to an understanding of biological computations we considered the topic of mindreading.            
Mindreading “performance” does not obey a simple cost function, there is less            
neuroscientific data to compare to and there are no databases for training the AI agents.               
Nonetheless, this does not imply that AI cannot contribute to understanding the            
algorithms underlying mindreading in the brain. We foresee that if one includes the bias              
of being more sensitive to humans (and other agents) and endows the agents with other               
components (e.g. external memory), these agents will be more successful in           
mindreading tasks. Having AI agents that are closer to humans in mindreading will help              
us to understand how mindreading skills are learned in the human brain. Discovering             
which algorithmic components are necessary for acquiring mindreading abilities will          
contribute to resolving many debates surrounding the cognitive and biological basis of            
mindreading (e.g. Siegal, 2008; Call & Tomasello, 2008; Apperly, 2010; Heyes & Frith,             
2014; Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). 
 
In this perspective we have focused on how certain similarities between biological and             
artificial neural networks can be exploited to gain understanding on how the brain might              
solve some computational problems. Obviously, these systems are also different in           
many important respects (Lake et al., 2016). Thus, it is essential to remark that we               
should not take DL architectures and their learning algorithms as the ultimate brain-like             
learning system, but simply as working examples that can guide our search for how the               
brain really works. So far DL remains our best source for working algorithms in              
 
large-scale tasks similar to those that animals have to solve. Given the difficulty in              
monitoring all the relevant variables in real brains and the inaccessibility to the brain’s              
masterplans, the fact that we can open these artificial algorithms and analyze them in              
detail provides a source of inspiration that we can not afford to not explore. 
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